“Cleaning up Elections: The Evolution of Electoral Integrity in New Democracies and Electoral Authoritarian Regimes”

Susanne Schmeidl2.jpg

Professor Sarah Birch
(University of Glasgow)

Popular protests following elections in electoral authoritarian states have become more common in recent years, yet few studies have analyzed this phenomenon. This paper draws on the literatures on contentious politics and electoral integrity to provide a novel account of post-electoral protest. The main argument is that because in the wake of the ‘third wave’ of democratization, the politics of electoral reform revolves mainly around the implementation of democratic electoral principles rather than around the principles themselves, electoral authoritarian leaders tend to employ forms of electoral abuse that entail giving unfair advantage to pro-regime electoral competitors, rather than excluding either voters or competitors from the electoral arena altogether. This means that citizens have electoral rights formally accorded to them but episodically abused, a pattern which is conducive to generating grievance. When such regimes ramp up forms of manipulation that favor pro-regime political forces, the resultant deterioration in election quality can then serve as a focal point which serves to mobilize citizens to mount mass protests. In as much as protest can, under the right circumstances, lead to reforms which improve electoral integrity, one of the implications of this argument is that elections often have to get worse before they get better.


Authoritarian Elections, Electoral Integrity, and Political Violence: Dangerous Choices from the Menu of Manipulation?

b_goldsmith.jpg

Associate Professor Ben Goldsmith
(University of Sydney)

This paper examines the conditions under which electoral integrity allows non-democratic societies to avoid violent conflict, and the conditions under which it might contribute to such conflict. While freer and fairer elections can pose a threat to those holding power in such regimes, elections with low integrity can lead to violence by a frustrated opposition. The consequences of electoral manipulation for political violence in non-democratic settings therefore are not immediately clear. I argue that the expectations of the opposition are central to these outcomes, and are affected by the type of authoritarian regime and the degree to which its electoral processes are consolidated. My findings indicate that higher levels of electoral integrity are associated with a greater risk of deadly violence in hegemonic authoritarian regimes at all times, but that greater electoral malpractice in multiparty anocracies with unconsolidated electoral systems raises the risk of deadly violence. This suggests that it is the threat posed to the incumbent’s power by elections with some integrity that is the main source of such violence in hegemonic regimes, while in multiparty anocracies violence stems from the actions of a frustrated opposition under conditions of electoral malpractice. There is little risk of major violence associated with elections in consolidated multiparty anocracies or in fully democratic states, but what risk exists is associated with manipulated elections.


"Vote buying in the 2014 Indonesian elections: goals, methods and problems."

Aspinallnewphoto.jpg

Professor Edward Aspinall (ANU)

This talk presents preliminary findings of a research project on patronage politics in the recent Indonesian legislative election. In particular, in one national electoral district in Java where research was conducted, the practice of vote buying – distribution of cash gifts and other goods to voters in the day or two leading up to the poll – was ubiquitous. Many candidates were willing to discuss the practice with our research team, and have provided access to their vote buying lists. This talk presents initial findings by way of addressing several questions that have guided previous research on vote buying in other settings. These are: 1) What structures do politicians construct in order to engage in vote buying? 2) How do they determine which voters to target? In particular, are they interested in mobilising swing voters (vote buying proper) or loyalists (turnout buying)? 3) How do they determine what, when and how much to give? 4) How are payments presented to voters? As a binding transaction? As a gift? 5) What measures do politicians use to minimize risk of wastage and ensure that voters do not renege on their side of the ‘deal’? By answering these questions we will analyse what has already become a deeply entrenched practice, yet one which is a fraught process offering its practitioners few guarantees of success.


"Electronic Voting and Electoral Integrity"

resource.jpg

Professor Rodney Smith (University of Sydney)

Most elections around the world involve paper ballots; however, various forms of electronic voting have become more widespread since the 1990s. This growth has not been uniform. Some governments have abandoned electronic voting following pressure group activity, opposition by political parties, negative technical evaluations and successful court challenges. Other governments have resisted calls to end electronic voting, either maintaining their existing electronic voting programs or modifying them in response to criticism. The dominant reasons for introducing, expanding, modifying and abandoning electronic voting differ from country to country. This paper examines the impact of concerns about electoral integrity on these different policy decisions. It presents a preliminary analysis of countries in Europe and the Americas, where moves to introduce electronic voting have been more widespread than in other parts of the world. The most commonly shared rationales for introducing electronic voting are modernisation and efficiency, rather than concerns about electoral integrity. Nonetheless, Central and South American governments have placed greater stress on the potential of electronic voting to reduce electoral fraud, while European and North American governments have highlighted its apparent capacity to achieve other goals, such as increasing voter turnout. These contextual differences appear to have consequences for later decisions to maintain or abandon electronic voting. While moves to introduce electronic voting in European and North American contexts have been vulnerable to fears about a loss of voter privacy and manipulation of the vote count, these concerns seem less evident and less powerful in Central and South America, possibly because in the latter contexts they are weighed against previously acknowledged forms of electoral integrity failure.


"Secrecy of the vote, integrity, and a change in global norms? Postal voting in comparative perspective"

norbert kesting.jpg

Professor Norbert Kesting
(University of Muenster)

The secrecy of the vote is enshrined in supranational legal frameworks for free and fair elections. Democratic innovations focusing on higher rates of participation and efficiency to enhance legitimacy can have consequences for electoral integrity and the secrecy of the vote. Postal voting and internet voting face similar problems regarding the secrecy of the vote. Both are open to coercion and voter interference. Nevertheless, more countries are experimenting with both methods, and postal voting has become the predominant way to cast a vote in some countries. What countries are implementing these instruments, when, and for what purposes? The paper discusses the proliferation of postal voting and secrecy of the vote as a norm. Is this a right to protect civil liberties against state interference or coercion within a social group (family, at work)? Are these legal frameworks in real life relevant and effective to prevent electoral misbehaviour? Is coercion a ubiquitous relevant behaviour and a threat to the legitimacy of elections? The norms should be consistent with values and attitudes of the citizenry. What are the attitudes within the citizenry? Are there changing political cultures and more liberal attitudes? Empirical evidence from different countries and survey data from a pilot e-voting project and exit polls in Germany in 2003 and 2013 are presented.


“Influencing public perception through negative campaigning: a threat to electoral integrity?”

Alessandro Nai.png

Dr. Alessandro Nai
(University of Geneva) and Dr. Ferran Martinez i Coma (University of Sydney)

This paper examines how the use of negative campaigning during Senate Elections in the United States (1992-2002) affects the way citizens perceive the electoral process. Building from the framework of research on Electoral Integrity, we focus on three dimensions: approval of elected officials, political interest, and external efficacy. Through ANES survey data and Lau and Pomper (2004) data on negative campaigning at the State level, we provide empirical evidence that the use of negative discourse during senatorial campaigns shapes how citizens perceive the electoral process. More specifically, we show that issue-based negative messages enhance perceptions of the electoral process, whereas person-based negative messages depress such perceptions. In light of these findings, we discuss if and how negative campaigning should be seen as a threat to electoral integrity.


"Election violence in the aftermath of civil war: The case of Nepal"

Richard Frank web.jpeg

Dr. Rich Frank
(University of Sydney)

After a civil war ends, the first post-conflict election can be an important test of the sustainability of peace. Many countries fail this test—either by returning to civil war or by using violent tactics to manipulate electoral outcomes. The conflict and elections literatures have explored the former (a return to civil war) but not the latter—situations where civil war does not recur but where former combatants use violence as a tool to manipulate the election process. Even less well understood is how and where electoral violence is used within a particular country. This manuscript begins to fill this gap by outlining the structural characteristics and election dynamics that shape the probability of the use of force. It presents a generalizable argument focusing on the similarities between the strategic dynamics of fighting a civil war and using election violence, and it empirically tests this argument using new data on the post-conflict election dynamics surrounding Nepal’s 2008 Constituency Assembly election. From 1996 to 2006 Nepal experienced a civil war that caused the deaths of over 15,000 people and displaced over 100,000. The 2008 Nepali election was a highstakes contest for a 601-seat assembly tasked with writing a new constitution. During the 2008 election cycle 50 people were killed, 116 were kidnapped, over 1,200 were injured, and violence occurred in 81% of Nepal’s 75 districts. Where, why, and by whom these events occurred are at the heart of this manuscript.


Talking among ourselves: why enclave deliberation curbs group polarization

Kimmo_Gronlund.jpg

Kimmo Grönlund (Abo Akademi University, Finland)

Discussant: Dr Ariadne Vromen, GIR, University of Sydney.

Chair: Professor Pippa Norris, University of Sydney/Harvard University

When like-minded people discuss with each other, (i.e. engage in ‘enclave deliberation’), their opinions tend to become more extreme. This is called group polarization. A population-based experiment with a pre-test post-test design was conducted to analyze whether the norms and procedures of deliberation interfere with the mechanisms of group polarization. Based on a survey, people with permissive or restrictive attitudes toward immigration were identified and invited to the experiment. Participants were randomly assigned to like-minded and mixed small-n groups. Each like-minded group consisted of only permissive or restrictive participants, whereas the mixed groups gathered both permissive and restrictive participants. The like-minded treatment represented enclave deliberation, and the mixed treatment a ‘standard’ deliberative mini-public design. The main finding of our experiment is that people with anti-immigrant attitudes became more tolerant even when they deliberated in like-minded groups. Moreover, similar learning curves were observed in both treatments. Our results suggest that deliberative norms curb group polarization, which calls for a modification of Sunstein’s (2002) law of group polarization.


Electoral reform, party system evolution and democracy in contemporary Indonesia

Sarah-Shair-Rosenfield-photo.jpg

Sarah Shair-Rosenfield (Arizona State University)

Discussant: Dr Zulfan Tadjoeddin, University of Western Sydney

How do changes in electoral rules affect political representation and the trajectory of democratization? I adopt the perspective that reforms to the electoral system are key mechanisms through which improved representation and democratic consolidation can take place. I argue for consideration of a broad view of elite motivations that includes the long-term consequences of political representation, such as the trade-offs between short-term seat gains versus medium- and long-term system stability or credibility with voters. I also consider the effects of gradual reform processes in which multiple rounds of reform may seek to re-adjust or correct the outcomes of previous reform choices. Using a global sample of cases of reform between 1950 and 2010, preliminary findings suggest that while intra-party reforms are likely to positively affect democratization, the positive effects of inter-party reform adoption are highly conditioned by the fragmentation of the preexisting party system. These relationships are further emphasized by iterated processes in a subsample of the cases. Finally, I investigate some of these mechanisms by focusing on the iterated reforms of the Indonesian case from 1999 to 2013.


Partisan gerrymandering in the United States: The impact of Cox v. Larios

Brunell.jpg

Tom Brunell (University of Texas, Dallas)

Discussant: Dr Brendan O'Conner, USSC, University of Sydney

Chair: Dr Ferran Martinez i Coma, University of Sydney

Partisan gerrymandering is a well-established practice in the United States. This paper compares the partisan use of population deviation for lower chambers of state legislatures across the United States in the 2000 and 2010 rounds of redistricting. In June 2004, the Supreme Court's 2004 decision on Cox v. Larios struck down the provision that state legislative districts need to be of roughly equal size, or the 'one, person, one vote' principle. The study predicts that the decision will have had an attenuating effect on population deviations overall, as well as a reduction in the blatant partisan use of population deviations. Data analyses indicate strong support for this argument.


Authoritarian Attitudes and Political Participation in Europe

Jeff Karp (1).jpg

Jeffrey Karp (Australian National University, Canberra)

Discussant: Professor Arthur Spirling, Harvard University

Chair:Professor Pippa Norris, University of Sydney/Harvard University

Comparisons of voter participation in Western and Eastern Europe indicate systematic differences between the two regions. In particular, the former Communist countries of Eastern Europe exhibit markedly lower levels of voter turnout than Western European countries. In this paper, we argue that citizens in Eastern Europe are more likely to exhibit authoritarian attitudes, which lowers citizens’ inclination to participate in the democratic process. Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) drawn from national election surveys in 22 countries in Eastern and Western Europe, we examine the relationship between authoritarian attitudes and voter participation in Europe. In doing so, we find that citizens in Eastern Europe express authoritarian values in greater numbers. Moreover, we demonstrate that citizens with authoritarian attitudes are less likely to vote, controlling for other factors that are traditionally used to explain differences in participation between the two regions, such as political or economic disenchantment and socialisation.


Why democracy prevails: A test of competing explanations

IgnacioLago.jpg

Ignacio Lago (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona)

Discussant: Dr Hilde Coffe, Victoria University of Wellington

Chair: Professor Pippa Norris, University of Sydney/Harvard University

After decades of research, the question of why democracy is an equilibrium remains open. The three potential mechanisms suggested by the literature have not been rigorously tested, (all groups must have a chance to attain power, income levels, and the probability of winning an armed conflict). One reason has been the lack of an appropriate measure of the dependent variable, --how losers react after an electoral defeat -- in advanced and new democracies. Using data from the Electoral Integrity Project capturing elites’ post-election behavior, in this paper the three mechanisms are tested through quantitative analyses.


Why elections fail: the importance of institutions

norris19 (2).jpg

Pippa Norris (University of Sydney and Harvard)

Discussant: Professor Richard Johnston, University of British Columbia

Chair: Dr Richard W. Frank, University of Sydney

Why do elections fail or succeed? Building upon accounts seeking to explain broader processes of democratization, the key factors can be divided into three categories emphasizing, respectively, the roles of fixed structural conditions, domestic institutions, and international determinants. The latter has been the focus of the most scholarly research, notably the role of international monitors and external pressures upon recalcitrant autocrats. By contrast, although there is a growing interest in the design of EMBs, far less is known about the impact of institutional drivers.

Part I in this study theorizes that power-sharing forms of electoral governance will strengthen integrity. The argument focuses upon the incentives and constraints facing political actors arising from the institutional and regulatory framework governing electoral processes and procedures. Part II establishes the evidence and Part III presents the results. The conclusions considers the lessons for theories explaining electoral integrity as well as for stakeholders and practitioners seeking to strengthen the quality of elections.


Political parties and gendered political representation

Elin.jpg

Elin Bjarnegård and Pär Zetterberg (Uppsala University)

Discussant: Dr Anna Boucher, GIR, University of Sydney

Chair: Dr Richard W. Frank, University of Sydney

Political parties have been described as being responsible for the male political over-representation almost everywhere in the world, and thus as the most important gatekeepers for women’s political representation. Exactly how political parties discriminate against women is, however, to a large extent, still shrouded in mystery. This paper suggests that informal practices in political parties’ candidate selection processes tend to benefit male aspirants over female ones. More specifically, the aim of this paper is to investigate if informal candidate selection procedures are beneficial for the political representation of men. We also wish to determine which, if any, specific informal selection criteria (i.e. criteria for candidate selection that are not included in party statutes) that generate a large number of male representatives (and conversely, a small number of female parliamentarians). To perform the analysis, we use OLS regression analyses on an original dataset produced by International IDEA that covers 145 parties in 35 countries in Africa, Asia, and Central and Eastern Europe. The data includes questions to party representatives about which informal criteria (if any) that play a role in the selection of candidates. This data is accompanied by data on parliamentary representation (by party and sex) that we have collected from the website of each parliament. Contrary to our expectations, we find that the informal selection critera here investigated are not beneficial for men. Instead, many informal criteria, in particular in certain contexts, are conducive to women’s access to political office. We illustrate these findings with case-study material about political party recruitment in Tanzania.


The legal regulation of political parties

AnikaGauja.jpg

Anika Gauja (University of Sydney)

Discussant: Professor Ignacio Lago

Chair: Professor Pippa Norris, University of Sydney/Harvard University

Synopsis:


Citizens' Mass Media Use and Accuracy of Their Perceptions of Electoral Integrity

hilde-coffe.jpg

Hilde Coffe (Victoria University of Wellington)

Discussant: Max Grömping, University of Sydney

Chair: Dr Ferran Martinez i Coma, University of Sydney

Combining data from the sixth wave (2010-2014) of the World Values Survey (WVS) and the 2012-2013 Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI) expert survey, this study tracks the accuracy of citizens’ perceptions of the quality of the electoral process across 13 new and established democracies. Building on literature on media use and political knowledge, it particularly looks at the link between the intensity of citizens’ informational use of various mass media and the accuracy of their perceptions. A multilevel analysis controlling for a variety of individual level controls and the countries’ levels of freedom of press shows that the more frequent citizens use TV to learn about what is going on in their country and the world, the less likely they are to have an accurate perception of the quality of the elections held in their country. By contrast, the intensity of listening to the radio for informative purposes has a positive effect. The intensity of the use of printed media (magazines and newspapers) and new media (internet and email) do not substantially affect citizens’ accuracy of their perceptions of electoral integrity. Yet, the effect of the use of printed media is conditional on the countries’ levels of freedom of press. It has a slightly more positive effect in countries with higher levels of press freedom. Similarly, the intensity of the use of TV tends to have a more positive effect on the accuracy of perceptions of electoral integrity in countries with higher levels of freedom of press.


Integrity and turnout

Ferran (1).png

Ferran Martinez i Coma (University of Sydney)

Discussant:Associate Professor Ben Goldsmith, University of Sydney

Chair: Dr Richard W. Frank, University of Sydney

Little attention has focused upon the issue of electoral integrity to explain turnout at the aggregate level. Electoral integrity and malpractices could contribute toward the explanation of voter turnout for several reasons. We discuss those explanations and with a unique dataset test how electoral integrity impacts turnout.