Electoral integrity

Electoral Integrity and Mexico’s Recall Referendum

In 2019, Mexico passed a constitutional reform that introduced the recall referendum, a mechanism to regulate whether the president’s term will conclude prematurely. The referendum is organized by Mexico’s National Electoral Institute (INE) and requires a validity threshold of 40% of registered voters. If this is met, the president is overthrown, provided that a majority votes for this. This exercise was held on 10 April 2022 with a small turnout of 17.77% of voters. Out of these, 91.8% voted for not recalling the president.

According to Mexico’s Constitution and Electoral Law, the recall referendum must be implemented in such a way that: citizens have a leading role in the process; that the playing field is levelled; and that there is no manipulation from the government. To ensure this, the referendum must be requested by citizens (at least 3% of those registered on the voter’s list), the use of public resources is prohibited, and all government propaganda is banned. Finally, INE and local election bodies are the only institutions authorized to promote the referendum.

In theory, this recall referendum should have been a citizen guided process, where voters decide autonomously whether the president keeps their job based on an evaluation of their performance. In practice, however, this first exercise played out quite differently, encountering serious election malpractice - Mexico’s Electoral Tribunal received a total of 6,939 legal challenges. For reviewing these we at the Electoral Tribunal applied a new legal approach we have been developing, consisting of judging with an ‘electoral integrity perspective’. The following is a sample of the irregularities found and the approach adopted by the Tribunal.

First, while the recall referendum was introduced in the Constitution in December 2019, its regulating law was not published until September 2021, 15 months after the deadline and when the process had already begun. In this regard, the Electoral Tribunal ruled that there was a “legislative omission” which violated citizen’s rights to participate. It was necessary to issue a specific law regulating the referendum and Congress was ordered to legislate. Furthermore, the published law was incomplete, which delayed the implementation of the process - an example being that the new law did not include relevant dispute resolution mechanisms[8].

Second, the budget to hold the referendum was insufficient. For 2022, INE requested budget to set up 162,570 polling stations, the same number of stations as a presidential election. However, Congress decided not to grant this budget and therefore INE could only set up about a third of stations (57,436). The Electoral Tribunal ruled that, despite this situation, the INE had to carry out the process to guarantee this direct democracy mechanism and with it, citizen’s rights.

Third, the process for collection of signatures needed to trigger the referendum was also problematic. Citizens flagged that they appeared on the petition to call the referendum without expressing their consent, and furthermore an NGO which promoted the recall referendum provided 14,490 formats with irregular information, pertaining to deceased citizens. In all these cases the Electoral Tribunal confirmed sanctions to individuals and organizations who presented false information.

Finally, this process was characterized by inequality, as the government and its party heavily promoted the referendum so the president would be ratified. The Electoral Tribunal identified that public officials disseminated propaganda when they were not allowed to do so by the Constitution. One case highlighted that 17 governors from the ruling party issued an unauthorized public statement supporting the president. Moreover, the president himself (also barred from participating, as the process was related to his own mandate) promoted his government’s achievements during public events.

As the recall referendum did not reach the required 40% turnout threshold, the Electoral Tribunal ruled it did not have any legal effects. All claims made were therefore not viable. However, the Tribunal stated that not meeting the threshold did not mean that certain irregularities should not be investigated, and if proven, punished. Therefore, the Tribunal provided different institutions files to investigate all irregularities and, where appropriate, sanction any illicit behavior. Claims ranged from accusations of party officials acting as polling officers, to people voting without a voter ID.

Mexico’s recall referendum brought a few key lessons. An electoral integrity perspective is usually applied only to traditional representative democracy elections – ranging from national level presidential contests to local municipal elections. However, as this novel exercise has shown us, we need to ensure that direct democracy processes are just as free and fair as other elections.

The malpractices encountered, from an inadequate legal framework, insufficient budget, irregularities in the collection of signatures to a lack of a playing field, show that direct democracy faces serious challenges in Mexico. Direct democracy should work as a tool for citizens to express their concerns, shape public policy and demand accountability. However, when not properly designed or implemented, these exercises can precisely prevent this goal.

Without electoral integrity, direct democracy exercises will not be able to achieve their full potential as a voice for citizens. This is why it is important to include this perspective when judging on electoral affairs, and this is what we did at the Tribunal. For us, the formula is simple: for any irregularity, the law should be applied; for any abuse or malpractice, political rights should be guaranteed.


Reyes Rodríguez Mondragón has held positions in all three branches of the Mexican government, as well as in autonomous bodies. He has been a magistrate within the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judiciary (TEPJF), both in the Regional Court in Monterrey and in the Superior Court. He was appointed as the Magistrate President of the TEPJF from 2021-2023.

Reyes holds a bachelor's degree in law from the Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico (ITAM) and pursued postgraduate studies at the Center for Research and Teaching in Economics (CIDE) and the International Institute for the Sociology of Law in Oñati, Spain. He is the author of various articles and academic publications, and has served as the director of the law program at CIDE.

Ireland has moved to improve electoral integrity – other countries should follow suit

Originally published July 15, 2022 on LSE’s EUROPP

Authors: Harsh Vasani, Toby James, and Holly Ann Garnett

On 13 July, Ireland passed an Electoral Reform Bill aimed at improving the country’s electoral integrity. Harsh Vasani, Toby S. James and Holly Ann Garnett assess the likely impact of the bill and the potential lessons other countries could draw from it.

Throughout the world, there have been concerns democracy has been ‘backsliding’ and that electoral integrity is under threat. A Summit for Democracy was hosted by the United States in December last year to ‘set forth an affirmative agenda for democratic renewal and to tackle the greatest threats faced by democracies’. Countries have been asked to make commitments to how they will improve democracy and elections.

The Irish government committed to establishing an independent statutory Electoral Commission. Academic research on electoral integrity and international best practices are clear that those involved in running and regulating elections should be independent from those standing from elections. However, many countries retain a system whereby government minsters have considerable control over electoral watchdogs, which compromises their independence. When Ireland gained independence from Britain, it established a system whereby elections were in the portfolio of a government minister and department – most recently the Department of Housing, Local Government and Heritage.

This commitment to establish a statutory, independent Electoral Commission for Ireland was honoured when an Electoral Reform Bill was passed on 13 July. But the Bill went further. The bill also promises the regulation of online political advertising with the aim of ensuring ‘transparency during electoral campaigns and… that our elections remain free from hidden influences on how we vote’.

The legislation came amidst calls to ban cryptocurrency donations to political parties. Given the identity of donors can be concealed when using cryptocurrencies, there are concerns such donations could create an avenue for foreign funding to influence election results. Donations made to political parties will also be scrutinised and the leader of each political party will have to declare to the Standards in Public Office Commission all donations to the party from outside the state, including all contributions, whether in cash or kind. Political parties will also be required to declare all the properties they own.

These reforms are important, too. The wider context is that there are major concerns about the possibility of foreign interference in elections. The alleged Russian interference in US elections cast light on the dangers of foreign interference in elections and manipulation of the electorate. It has been suggested that we have therefore entered an era of ‘cyber elections’.

Ireland’s electoral integrity weak spots

The legislation has been in the news for many weeks vis-à-vis electoral funding, foreign interference, online disinformation, and empowering the election commission. But does it speak to the problems that Ireland actually faces with elections?

The Electoral Integrity Project recently published the 2022 Electoral Integrity Global Report that scores countries on the quality of electoral integrity around the world. The report evaluates all aspects of elections – from the laws through the campaign and voter registration. The report is based on a rolling survey of 4,591 experts across 169 countries. Figure 1 illustrates Ireland’s areas of strength and weakness over the past decade. The data from the Electoral Integrity Project is available online here.

Figure 1: Country-level scores for electoral integrity in Ireland

Note: The figure is based on the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI-8.0) index, 2012-21.

The data shows that Ireland scores the poorest on voter registration. The scores on voter registration were 34 for the period of 2012-18. A comparison with Finland (95-96), Sweden (88-90) and Denmark (93-91), the three highest scorers on the perceptions of electoral integrity (PEI) index, illustrates just how poorly Ireland fares on perceptions of voter registration.

The voter registration index is measured on indicators such as whether some citizens were not listed in the register, the electoral register was inaccurate, or some ineligible electors were registered. Figure 2 illustrates the extent to which these were a problem on a five-point scale. Citizens missing from the electoral register was the greatest problem – but it was also the case that the register contained ineligible electors.

Figure 2: Electoral registration problems in Ireland

Note: The figure is based on the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI-8.0) index, 2012-21.

The good news is that the Bill also contains provisions to improve voter registration. These include a move to continuous registration based on an individual application, data sharing to assist registration authorities in updating and maintaining the register, and annual reporting by registration authorities to the newly established Commission.

The establishment of the Commission could therefore play an important role in redressing these problems in the coming years. In particular, the legislation enables the Commission to undertake research on the accuracy and completeness of the register – research which has generated important insights in the UK to reveal the extent of the ‘missing millions’.

Other dimensions of electoral integrity have fared better in Ireland. Vote counting and results work very well. The electoral finance index is more troubled with a score of 64. But it is worth noting that problems with money and elections are a huge problem worldwide – the Electoral Integrity Project report found that it was the weakest aspect of elections worldwide. The world should therefore watch closely to see if Ireland’s new legislation works – and whether there is an improvement in future report scores.

Looking forward: automatic voter registration?

Given that voter registration is the main weakness, it is notable that there are, however, policy fixes which are not legislated for, which should be considered in future years as the Electoral Reform Bill beds in. Many countries have recently moved to introduce some aspect of automatic voter registration. Rather than relying on individual applications (a requirement for individual applications reduces voter registration levels), voters can be registered by the authorities without requiring electors to take action. Comparative research shows that this can improve completeness and does not affect accuracy.

It is difficult for countries like Ireland to introduce this system without a civil population register. A more appropriate approach, as a recent voter registration report shows, is therefore to automatically enrol the population when they reach critical life moments such as becoming eligible to vote for the first time. Nonetheless, Ireland has been proactive in responding to the call to strengthen democratic electoral institutions. Other countries should do the same, and the Electoral Integrity Report can help them to do so.

Harsh Vasani is a PhD student in the School of Development at the University of East Anglia.

Toby S. James is Professor of Politics and Public Policy at the University of East Anglia. He is co-Director of the Electoral Integrity Project and Editor in Chief of Policy Studies.

Holly Ann Garnett is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, Ontario, and cross-appointed faculty at Queen’s University, in Kingston, Ontario, Canada. She is co-Director of the Electoral Integrity Project.

Featured image credit: European Council

Why it’s not about election fraud, it's much worse.

Why it’s not about election fraud, it's much worse.

Ever since Bush v. Gore in 2000, the way that American elections are run has become increasingly partisan and contentious. The 2016 elections ratcheted up the record number of complaints by all parties.  New evidence from the EIP project compares the performance of U.S. states in the 2016 elections based on the first results of an expert survey.